A permissive theory of territorial rights by Ypi, Lea
  
Lea Ypi 
A permissive theory of territorial rights 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Ypi, Lea (2014) A permissive theory of territorial rights. European Journal of Philosophy, 22 (2). 
pp. 288-312. ISSN 1468-0378  
 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00506.x 
 
© 2012 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/38545/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: March 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
1 
 
Lea Ypi 
A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights 
(forthcoming in The European Journal of Philosophy) 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the justification of states’ territorial rights.  It starts by introducing three questions 
that all current theories of territorial rights attempt to answer: how to justify the right to settle, the right 
to exclude, and the right to settle and exclude with reference to a particular territory.  It proposes a 
“permissive” theory of territorial rights, arguing that the citizens of each state are entitled to the 
particular territory they collectively occupy, if and only if they are also politically committed to the 
establishment of a global political authority realizing just reciprocal relations.  The article is developed by 
introducing some key features of the permissive theory and by explaining how such an account addresses 
the questions of settlement, exclusion and particularity in ways that significantly improve on existing 
rival accounts (most prominently: acquisition theories, legitimacy-based theories and nationalist 
theories). 
 
 
Territory is contested. It is both contested from the inside, when secessionist 
movements and autonomist groups threaten to disrupt the continuity of states’ 
boundaries and from the outside, when foreigners attempt to enter a country or when 
other states and non-state actors raise claims to the territory’s natural resources. 
Territory is also immensely important. Human beings are both socially and spatially 
situated. The state’s ability to exercise territorial rights protects individuals from 
external threats, creates opportunities for political participation and shapes the 
geographical space in which citizens can lead their lives on the basis of reliable 
institutional expectations. But what exactly justifies states’ territorial rights? 
One way of addressing the issue is by interrogating the past: a people’s historical 
entitlements to the land they presently occupy, the attachments they have developed to 
each other, or the institutions they have jointly established. One arresting concern with 
that account is being able to find a single state whose citizens could claim a clean 
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historical title; a single group of people whose presence in a specific territory does not 
involve arbitrary dynastic arrangements, acts of theft and usurpation of land, or war 
against particular groups of the population. 
Another way of proceeding is by considering the present. But suppose we can 
create a perfectly just state by simply occupying others’ land. If we limit our attention to 
the present performance of a state’s institutions we may not be able to perceive what’s 
morally problematic about the way they come about.  
Existing theories of territorial rights seem caught between those two conflicting 
sides: either they deliver primarily past-oriented principles or they deliver primarily 
present-oriented ones. An alternative way of proceeding might be to elaborate a theory 
whose principles reflect sensitivity to the past whilst keeping in mind the necessity of 
ongoing obligations. This is what I propose to explore in this article, and to do so by 
outlining what I shall call ´a permissive theory of territorial rights´. 
This theory owes much to Kant’s account of political obligation and his related 
analysis of cosmopolitanism. Both questions have been widely discussed in other 
contexts. However, an attempt to consider their application to issues of territorial rights 
is long overdue.1 This article explores some features of the Kantian theory so as to 
reconstruct an alternative conception, to illustrate how it differs from other views (most 
prominently: acquisition theories, nationalist theories and legitimacy-based theories) 
and to emphasize its distinctive take on issues of state justification and territorial 
adjudication. In the end, even readers who might be only partially convinced by the 
account of territorial rights developed here will hopefully agree that it represents a 
distinctive account worth articulating. 
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The article proceeds as follows. Section I introduces permissive principles. 
Section II defines territorial rights and introduces three questions that all current 
theories of territorial rights appear to face: justifying the right to settle, justifying the 
right to exclude and justifying the right to settle and to exclude with reference to a 
particular territory. Section III outlines the basic premises shared by all these theories 
and outlines the key components of the permissive account. Sections IV, V, VI each 
explain how the permissive theory of territorial rights might help us address the 
question of settlement, the question of exclusion and the question of particularity. 
Section VII examines some objections and implications. Section VIII concludes. 
 
II. 
 
To understand what is at the heart of the permissive theory of territorial rights, it pays 
to start with an example. Take the case of a very conscientious environmentalist NGO, 
whose members have decided to reduce their carbon footprint by never taking the 
plane. Suppose that at some point in the past they were invited to explain their motives 
to a meeting in which environmentally-relevant decisions regarding the reduction of 
travels by plane would be taken. Suppose further that at the time of the meeting the 
only way for them of reaching the location of the meeting was actually taking the plane. 
We can reflect on their action by adopting a permissive principle. Such a principle 
explains how they were allowed to suspend the prohibition of not taking the plane, for 
purposes of attending a meeting which would promote the reduction of plane travels. 
The principle permits us to contingently suspend at T1 the principle to ´not-Φ´, if the 
action of Φ-ing contributes to establishing a state of affairs in which the principle of 
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´not-Φ-ing` is promoted. It may be possible however, that if the meeting succeeded in 
reducing plane travels, other ways of reaching certain locations became available. 
Hence, at T2, the permissive principle ceased to apply.   
A permissive principle is therefore both conditional and provisional. It is 
conditional because it is invoked to reflect on an action otherwise incompatible with a 
certain principle, subject to its contributing to a state of affairs through which that 
principle is promoted. And it is provisional because the state of affairs that permissive 
principles justify is not peremptory: it is only there for as long as the end in the light of 
which the permission was initially introduced is not fully realized. 
This explanation takes us close to the Kantian definition of permissive laws.2 A 
permissive law, according to Kant, is ´necessitation to an act such that one cannot be 
necessitated to do it` (8: 348; 321 fn). This apparently obscure definition is meant to 
introduce a third kind of norm (in addition to commands and prohibitions) required to 
exceptionally justify acts that we would ordinarily consider incompatible with 
principles of right. The Kantian idea that an action is incompatible with principles of 
right if it cannot coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with universal law (6: 
231; 387) has already been discussed by other authors (e.g. most recently Ripstein 
2009). What bears emphasis is the relationship of this definition to permissive 
principles, i.e. their employment to assess normatively relevant circumstances in which 
a course of action incompatible with the idea of equal freedom is pursued.3 Much of my 
analysis in this article will focus on what these normatively relevant circumstances 
might be. However, it is important to insist that permissive principles justify states of 
affairs incompatible with the idea of ´right` only provisionally and conditionally. That is, 
they justify actions incompatible with principles of right, subject to a commitment to 
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bring about states of affairs which realize the idea of equal freedom, and for as long as 
principles of right are not in place. A similar way of putting the question implies that it 
might be possible that, at T1, an action is incompatible with principles of right but 
justified because it is the only way through which those principles could be realized. 
This does not mean that the same permission is also required at T2, where other 
avenues might be available. Hence, permissive principles are principles of transition: 
they apply to past actions but not necessarily to future ones. However, they are not 
morally indifferent. An action that is morally indifferent does not require any special 
principle to be brought about. 
I shall say more about permissive principles and about the circumstances in 
which they apply in the pages that follow. For now it is important to explain how this 
apparently abstract definition of permissive principles relates to the question of states’ 
territorial rights. These territorial rights have been established during historical 
processes marked by political conflicts, population displacements or dynastic 
arrangements (e.g. inheritance, exchange, transfer) which have led to an entirely 
arbitrary partition of boundaries. Citizens’ control of specific territories reflects 
unilateral decisions that, as we shall shortly see, can only be provisionally and 
conditionally justified. Now, according to the theory developed here, states are only 
permitted to exercise territorial rights. Their citizens’ acquisition and exclusive control 
of such territories is provisional and conditional upon their contribution to the full 
realization of the principle of right. 
What exactly all this means will be clarified in greater detail shortly. But one 
point deserves to be mentioned at the outset. Even though throughout the article I refer 
to states’ obligation to create a political authority responsible for realizing the universal 
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principle of right, I say very little about how that proposal should be empirically 
formulated. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the aim of the article is more 
critical than constructive: it tries to illustrate what is wrong with the existing way of 
conceptualizing territorial rights and points to the need for answering that question 
from a new perspective. My theory of territorial rights only explains why states have a 
reciprocal obligation to realize the principle of right, not where that obligation exactly 
leads. Giving reasons for why a certain kind of obligation should be acknowledged is a 
different (and perhaps more modest) enterprise from specifying what form the 
institutions reflecting that obligation ought to take. 
But there is also another reason for resisting the temptation to be more specific 
on what the universal realization of the principle of right concretely implies. Developing 
views on how a certain kind of political institution should look like is not just a matter of 
moral principle; it is also a question of contingent political judgment. To indulge 
ourselves in instructing citizens on what they should concretely do to reform specific 
political institutions, not only defies their democratic commonsense, it also threatens to 
issue the same kind of unilateral requirements that makes the permissive theory of 
territorial rights required in the first place. This, of course, does not imply that there are 
no moral constraints whatsoever on what kind of political authority realizing the 
principle of right the citizens of particular states can consistently establish, or that there 
is nothing we can say to facilitate their political task. We might have good reasons to 
insist for example that a similar global authority ought to make collective decisions with 
regard to some areas and not others, following some procedures (e.g. democratic ones) 
and not others. We might also want to question the extent to which a similar political 
authority ought to have coercive capacity or whether states should be part of it only 
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once they have reformed themselves in a certain direction (e.g. republican one). 
However, providing a complete analysis of these requirements is separate from the 
attempt to show why the creation of a similar political authority is justified, and how 
that obligation lies at the heart of the permissive theory of territorial rights. 4  
  
III. 
 
What is the territorial state? The term ´territory` (in Latin territorium) derives from the 
combination of the words terra, that is ´land`, with ´torium`, which means ´belonging to`. 
The word therefore indicates the possession of a geographical unit by an agent, be it an 
individual, family, company or any other kind of artificial institution responsible for the 
use of the land (terra) and its subsequent transformation (Taylor1985: 95-140).5 The 
term ´state`, on the other hand, derives from the Latin status and in its first, Medieval 
connotation, it was employed to denote both the ´state` or ´personal standing` of the 
rulers, and the ´state` or ´conditions` of the realm or commonwealth understood as an 
independent political unit (Skinner 1989).6 When the word progressively shifted 
meaning to the modern concept we are more familiar with, it indicated a form of 
institutional organization, distinct from the rulers and the ruled as well as responsible 
for the exercise of power in making and changing the laws of a specific unit.  
The term ´territorial state` is therefore linked to a collective’s exercise of political 
power over a geographical area through an artificial political agent such as the state.7 
States’ territorial rights can be understood with reference to a threefold relationship 
between a bounded geographical area (the territory of the state), the people controlling 
the land (i. e. citizens in their capacity as both the rulers and ruled) and the institutions 
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through which their control of the land is exercised.8 In order to understand why states 
have territorial rights theorists therefore attempt to answer three questions. Firstly, 
what justifies citizens’ entitlement to occupy a bounded area of geographical space? Call 
this the question of settlement. Secondly, what justifies their right to permanently 
control the territory? Call this the question of exclusion. And thirdly, what explains their 
ability to settle in and exclude others from a specific piece of territory? Call this the 
question of particularity. 
Different theories of territory have different ways of addressing these concerns. 
In what follows I shall not examine in detail these theories but only refer to them as a 
point of comparison with my own account, especially when it comes to answering the 
three questions raised above. The starting premises are intended to be ecumenical and 
appeal to normative assumptions that all existent theories of territorial rights should 
find uncontroversial. These premises are then further developed in ways that allow us 
to perceive the distinctive appeal of the permissive theory. 
 
IV.  
  
In asking why states have territorial rights at all, it pays to start with a thought 
experiment. Imagine the universe as initially unaffected by territorial claims. Its 
resources are fully available for use to all human beings and anyone’s claim to freely be 
in a particular piece of territory is as good as that of anyone else. The rationale for the 
thought experiment is fairly clear. The transition to a stage in which agents enjoy 
exclusive control rights over certain areas and against certain people follows a stage in 
which everyone in the universe is free to be in these areas. If we want to explain how X 
9 
 
becomes a function of Z we need to imagine a counterfactual situation in which X is not 
a function of Z and then try to understand the change. Hence, to say that something is 
available for use is significantly different from saying that it is owned in common.9 In 
the first case the assumption is needed only as a heuristic device, to understand how it 
is that something that everyone could initially use becomes something that some agents 
exclusively control (Ypi 2011). But what justifies the transition from a stage in which 
agents can freely inhabit and use any area of the earth to one in which they settle and 
exclude others according to specific jurisdictional boundaries? 
Most theorists of territorial rights would endorse (or at least not reject) the 
starting premises of this thought experiment. They would also agree on the relevance of 
the question that follows from them. However, their understanding of the conditions 
under which particular agents can claim territorial rights over particular pieces of the 
earth is strikingly different. So, for example, acquisition theorists consider territorial 
rights a derivate of agents’ (be them individuals or collectives) property rights in the 
land.10 Nationalists emphasize the material and symbolic value of the land for its 
inhabitants and the kind of cultural and political attachment they develop to it (Miller 
forthcoming; Meisels 2005; Moore 1998. Legitimacy-based theories insist on the 
institutional opportunities that states make available to their own citizens, i.e. the 
establishment of a rightful political order, respect for basic rights, creating 
opportunities for political participation, and so on (Buchanan 2004; Stilz 2011, also 
Waldron 1993). The permissive theory of territorial rights outlined below shares some 
features with all of these theories. However, it differs with respect to two crucial 
dimensions. 
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The first has to do with the unit of justification. In all current theories of 
territorial rights justification is mainly constructed with reference to the claims of 
agents within the state (or the nation): property owners in the case of the acquisition 
account; members of particular ethnic groups or nationalities in the case of nationalist 
accounts; citizens in the case of legitimacy-based accounts. In asking why states have 
territorial rights, the relationship between the state and these agents takes normative 
priority. Alternatively, in the permissive theory of territorial rights, the unit of 
justification is universal both across space (it extends to the citizens of other states and 
to stateless people) and across time (it extends to future generations). I shall return to 
this in the following pages. 
The second difference has to do with the nature of justification. In all the theories 
mentioned above the justification of territorial rights is conclusive: once the conditions 
under which states are entitled to particular territories have been established, their 
claims to such territories are secure and binding. By contrast, in the permissive theory 
outlined here, states’ claims to particular pieces of territory are justified only 
conditionally and provisionally. States can continue to exercise territorial rights if and 
only if their citizens are also politically committed to the establishment of a global 
authority realizing an all-inclusive principle of right. This is where the permissive 
account of territorial rights follows Kant’s justification of political obligation and his 
analysis of cosmopolitanism. Much more needs to be said in order to understand firstly, 
why these collective obligations are required and, secondly, how exactly they are 
supposed to work. As already mentioned, this article engages mostly with the former 
question. To get a clearer grasp of the problem, we need to start by closely examining 
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how the Kantian theory might help us understand the right to settle, the right to exclude 
and the rights to settle and exclude with regard to a particular territory. 
 
V.  
 
Let us start with the right to settle. Settlement, according to the Oxford English 
dictionary, is the ´placing of persons or things in a fixed or permanent position`. 11 The 
definition already directs us to the idea that part of understanding why states have 
territorial rights requires explaining why their citizens have a right to settle, i.e. 
permanently stay in the territory defined by the boundaries of the state. This in turn 
requires analyzing, firstly, how their citizens have a right to permanently stay in a 
certain area of geographical space and, secondly, how they relate to each other in doing 
so. This amounts to clarifying both how an agent A can establish a lasting relationship 
with external things (how he comes to acquire them in the first place) and how another 
agent B can refrain from claiming access to those things even if A is not physically 
present (how they can be permanently maintained). Explaining permanent access 
therefore consists of two elements: relationship of agents to external things 
(acquisition) and relationship of agents to other agents. Even if, as we shall shortly see, 
the former element turns out to be normatively secondary, it is important in order to 
explain agent’s special relation to physical things from a subjective perspective.  
So let us begin with acquisition. The first acquisition of an external object, Kant 
says, can only be the acquisition of the land (6:261; 414). This is because land 
constitutes the physical space upon which all other movable objects are placed. As he 
argues following Aristotle, just as in a theoretical sense accidents cannot exist apart 
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from substance, so in a practical sense no one can have what is movable on a piece of 
land permanently as his, unless one is assumed to be in rightful possession of the land 
(6: 262; 414). 
One might find this claim slightly puzzling. Do I need to possess the street on 
which the car is parked in order to possess the car? Does understanding people’s 
relationship to the land really need to precede our understanding of their relationship 
to other external things? To see this point, think about the situation of refugees. 
Refugees have been forced to leave their territory, and they have no guaranteed place 
where to stay. Their position on Earth is not secure. This renders them vulnerable to the 
decisions of others, and unable to set and pursue ends in a reliable manner. Consider, 
for example, how a first-generation Palestinian refugee who has been living for most of 
his life in a Syrian refugee camp summarizes the start of his experience of displacement 
following 1948: 
 
We wandered around different villages; we stayed one week here and two weeks there until we were 
later deported to Bintjbail village in the south of Lebanon. The Lebanese army picked Palestinians from 
the streets and transferred them to Anjar. We were among the people who were transferred to Bal’bek 
and we lived there for one year. In 1950 we arrived to Syria by train. We hired a small house, but soon 
after our landlord kicked us out because we were too large a family to rent his property (Chatty and 
Hundt 2005: 61).  
  
Or consider how another Palestinian child, a third-generation refugee, summarizes the 
deprivations suffered by life in a camp: 
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Football is my favourite game; we play in the street of our camp because we do not have a playground to 
practice. People in the neighbouring houses often shout at us and order us to play away from their 
houses.  We are always scared of being hurt by passing cars (Chatty and Hundt 2005: 66). 
 
Failing to have one’s place on Earth secured severely impairs individuals’ ability to 
pursue their own ends. It deprives them of the possibility to form reliable life plans and 
to access opportunities necessary to promote them. Hence it seems important to 
address the issue of individuals’ relationship to the land, before attempting to clarify 
their relationship to other external things. 
Kant, as already anticipated, analyses this question by directing attention to 
initial acquisition and to an agent’s subjective control of the land (occupation). And he 
also clarifies that even if, on the one hand, the agent is at freedom to acquire land in 
order to pursue ends in it; on the other hand, by doing so, he necessarily interferes with 
the ends of others. So, for example, a latecomer would be constrained in his freedom to 
use previously available resources, finding that the first occupier has now imposed on 
him an obligation to refrain from accessing the land.  
Many will find this claim puzzling.  One objection might be that if, for example, 
that first occupier acts so as to leave ´enough and as good` land and resources available 
to latecomers, unilateral control need not imply curtailment of the freedom of others. 
Notice however that from a Kantian perspective this proviso-based objection is 
problematic. It relies on a presumption of abundance which clashes with a different 
empirical scenario whereby the finite nature of land and resources constrain their 
legitimate use. Even if we conceded that the scarcity of geographical space does not 
affect all other living human beings, nothing guarantees that future generations will not 
suffer the consequences of a past unilateral distribution.  
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Some might reply here that the issue could be solved by appropriately reducing 
the size of present holdings in proportion with the rise of other’s claims (from members 
of either existing generations or future ones). But, as we shall see below, the boundaries 
and content of one’s holdings, how much to reduce and where, cannot be unilaterally 
(or even bilaterally) established. Whilst unilateral claims ground provisional 
permissions to continue enjoying the benefits of land one contingently occupies, 
interference with the ends of others arises from the fact that similar decisions are 
unilaterally made.12 
Finally, given Kant’s emphasis on first occupancy as a subjective criterion for 
legitimate settlement, one might worry about its implications for present-day claims. 
Very few territorial boundaries have been established during settlement processes 
which did not involve wrongdoing of any kind, be it through war of conquest, dynastic 
inheritance, purchase or repression of particular groups of the population. Kant’s 
remarks about first occupation might here ring obsolete, raising concerns about the 
implications of the argument for descendents of people who live in a particular area as a 
result of similar historical violations. Does the permission to settle fail to apply to their 
case?  
I shall return to this question at the end of the article, when clarifying Kant’s 
view of annexation. But the objection gives us an opportunity to suggest a reading of 
Kant’s criterion of first occupancy which sees it as part response/part concession to 
accounts that combined this criterion with labour theories of acquisition, i. e Locke’s 
theory. First occupancy, one should notice, places only weak constraints; it works from 
a subjective perspective but may not be reciprocally-binding. The condition is there to 
remind us that given common ownership of a previously uninhabited piece of the Earth, 
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unavoidable occupation, and control of the territory suffice for an agent to make use of a 
particular piece of land. Nothing more (for example, adding value to the land) is 
required from a Kantian perspective. But the argument does no more work than that, it 
only explains retroactively how one can take control and make use of a certain, 
previously uninhabited territory, not what entitles  agents to remain in it once a certain 
violation has occurred. In this sense, the criterion is of little guidance to solve the 
problem of descendants of people whose presence in the territory necessarily implies 
interaction with other groups. The question can be answered not by looking at the 
criteria for settlement but to those for exclusion.   Even though an agent cannot avoid 
`occupying` a particular area of geographical space by virtue of being free to pursue his 
ends there, the exclusion of potential others (who retain their initial equal right of use) 
obtains only a permissive authorization. Allowing an agent to acquire land following the 
criteria specified, amounts to suspending the prohibition of interfering with other’s 
ends only in a provisional and conditional way. Why?  
Recall that we defined settlement as the placing of persons and things in a 
permanent position. We further argued that the justification of this act depends upon an 
understanding of how the possibility to control things on a permanent basis is possible. 
The criteria laid out above are sufficiently strong to explain how agents can be 
subjectively placed in a relevant position to acquire external things; e.g. how they might 
have a prima facie justifiable claim to access objects (or land) in physical space. Given 
their freedom to be in that area of the earth where nature had placed them, agents could 
not have been morally prevented from occupying it. But notice that to take possession 
of any portion of physical space in ways that are relevant to justify lasting possession, 
implies imposing on other agents an obligation to continuously refrain from interfering 
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with their use of those natural objects. How can we justify that unilaterally imposed 
obligation?  
If one of the conditions justifying settlement is communal use of the earth, prior 
occupation justifies the unilateral exclusion of others only provisionally and 
conditionally.  It is not enough to say that settlement in the territory promotes a 
sufficiently important end of agents. Any lasting claim to the land requires a justification 
of the ability to permanently control the use of its resources and to force others to 
refrain from accessing a good (e.g. the land) that the regime of communal use initially 
guaranteed. Therefore to understand the provisional and conditional nature of the 
permission to occupy a piece of land, we need to turn to the second important aspect of 
possession: its relational aspect. That is to say, we need to consider not just how agents 
can establish a lasting relationship with external things from a subjective perspective 
(how they come to acquire them in the first place) but how others can rightfully 
acknowledge the obligation of refraining to access them. It thus turns out that the issue 
of settlement cannot be sorted out without addressing the issue of exclusion.  
 
VI.  
 
We emphasized that settlement through prior occupation is too weak a criterion to 
explain how agents can conclusively enjoy rights to permanently be in the land. One 
notable difficulty the strategy faces is that it only refers to the relationship of agents 
with external things without justifying the imposition of a unilateral obligation of 
abstention on other agents. Taking control of an external object (in this case, a piece of 
land) in ways that are relevant to justify settlement implies that the object is put in one 
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agent’s service and rendered unavailable to everyone else. If such agents are to control 
or derive benefits from the land in a lasting way, the exclusion of outsiders from making 
analogous claims seems like an essential requirement. But under what conditions can 
that requirement be satisfied? Who is in a position to impose the relevant obligation of 
abstention?  
The answer here cannot be that this obligation-imposing authority lies with the 
agent who presently enjoys the benefits of the land. For why should this agent, simply 
because he is in a position to take control of external things, also enjoy the right to 
impose obligations of abstention on others?  
Kant thinks that it is possible to overcome the impasse that the issue of original 
acquisition generates by making the authorization of unilateral possession conditional 
upon subjection to a collective political authority distributing rights and obligations 
compatible with principles of equal freedom. Kant’s analysis of political obligation and 
his justification of the state have already been adequately explored by others. What has 
gone little noticed is the extension of the permissive principle at the heart of Kant’s 
account of political obligation to the relationship between citizens of different states 
and the justification of their territorial claims. This cosmopolitan complement to Kant’s 
domestic account of political obligation (in fact their interdependence) has been largely 
neglected in the literature (for one exception see Flikschuh 2010). To understand the 
rationale for its application we need to return to the issue of how political authority is 
essential for the application of permissive principles to acts of unilateral acquisition. 
Rather than being understood as permanently justified claims that warrant 
agents’ consent to a civil condition (as in many acquisition theories of territory) the 
right of individuals to settle is considered a merely ´provisional` allowance, which 
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permits agents to take control and make use of the land subject to their endorsement of 
political obligations realizing the principle of right. Unilateral acts of acquisition are 
authorized if they also entail a commitment to join a political condition in which 
relationships between persons (hence, indirectly, also their access to resources) are 
regulated by appealing to a public political authority. This implies that it is only possible 
to rightfully have something external as one’s own if, with the very act of acquiring 
external resources by unilateral means, we also accept the necessity of a collectively 
established political authority ruling in the name of all. In this way, the unilaterality of 
initial acquisition and the arbitrary use of exclusionary force is mitigated by the 
commitment to make our will consistent with others’ will through collective rules of 
property arbitration and enforcement. The necessity of initial acquisition is understood 
through a provisional allowance of the unilateral claim to use previously available land. 
Yet, at the same time that claim triggers an obligation to join a rightful political 
authority, where freedom in the use of external objects is made consistent with that of 
all others. Political obligations are already inscribed in agents’ enjoyment of benefits 
that occupancy de facto confers on them. Others are being wronged regardless of the 
agent’s intentions, and that wrong ought to be redressed, even if one fails to 
acknowledge it as such. As Kant puts it, ´the way to have something external as one’s 
own in the state of nature […] has in its favor the rightful presumption that it will be 
made into rightful possession through being united with the will of all in a public 
lawgiving`. In the absence of this presumption, a right to having anything external as 
one’s own is not absolutely granted but holds only ´comparatively` as rightful 
possession (6: 257; 410). Permissive principles are governed by collective political 
obligations. 
19 
 
We might be tempted to restrict the application of these claims to the 
justification of individual possession, which one might think is finalized upon subjection 
to a collective political authority such as the one embodied by the state. Following a 
similar interpretation, the state’s ability to exercise territorial rights would be justified 
in virtue of its capacity to make and enforce rules turning the provisional holdings of its 
citizens into rightful property, consistently with the principle of equal freedom. This is, 
for example, how legitimacy-based accounts usually justify states’ ability to exercise 
territorial rights (Buchanan 2004: 233-88; Waldron 1993; Stilz 2011). But the position 
developed in this article is different and more radical. The point of the argument about 
permissibility is to emphasize that any unilateral act of settlement is always partial 
unless coupled with an obligation to enter into universally inclusive political relations. 
The objections raised above, apply both to individuals taken as such, and to individuals 
considered as citizens of particular states. The unilaterality of settlement remains 
(although in qualitatively different ways) in both cases. This means that even the 
private possessions of individuals within a state are not conclusively established in the 
absence of the commitment to universally inclusive political relations. 
 All those who are brought together by nature and chance cannot avoid affecting 
one another (i.e. interfering with each other’s freedom). Under these circumstances, 
joining a rightful political authority is obligatory; indeed it is the only condition under 
which permissive principles can authorize unilateral settlement. States enjoy territorial 
rights because they impose a public system of laws which establishes rightful conditions 
of co-existence between all those that nature or chance has placed next to each other. 
Membership in this rightful political authority is something that citizens inherit through 
shared political participation. But the relational logic of the argument is such that it 
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does not cease to apply at this point. Since the Earth’s surface is not unlimited but 
closed, Kant argues, the reciprocal influence upon each other’s freedom is simply 
carried from one level to the next: states cannot avoid being next to each other. This is 
also what explains the necessity of establishing relations of right between states: 
citizens of different jurisdictions cannot avoid affecting each other in their use of 
physical space. 
To claim that the citizens of different states cannot avoid affecting each other in 
the international sphere does not necessarily imply that they are in exactly the same 
position as individuals in the state of nature (although Kant does make use of the 
argument by ´analogy` at various points). What it means is that even the possessions of 
individuals within the state are not conclusive unless this universal union realizing the 
principle of right has been established. Domestic, international and cosmopolitan right, 
are interdependent rather than analogous. Or, as Kant puts it: ´if the principle of outer 
freedom limited by law is lacking in any one of these three possible forms of rightful 
condition, the framework of all the others is unavoidably undetermined and must finally 
collapse` (6: 311; 455).13   
It is worth noticing that the reasons for this collapse are already inscribed in the 
prohibition that permissive principles allow us to suspend: the wrongness of unilateral 
acquisition and the interference with others’ freedom. A unilateral will can ´justify an 
external acquisition only in so far as it is included in a will that is united a priori (i.e. 
only through the union of the choice of all who can come into practical relations with 
one another) and that commands absolutely` (my italics). External acquisition remains 
provisional even after individuals have joined particular states, because the relational 
logic of the argument is of a potential not of an actually existing kind; it does not apply 
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merely to those who are connected at present but also to those who can come into 
practical relations. Unilaterality is not absolved when those who come in face to face 
contact with each other establish a political union according to criteria that respect the 
equal freedom of all. A similar union continues to make decisions that place under 
specific obligations both those excluded in space (e.g. non-members of that political 
association) but also those excluded in time (e.g. future generations).14 
How exactly should we understand this obligation of the citizens of different 
states to enter into rightful political relations to each other? And what does the 
permissive theory of territorial rights have to say with regard to existing conflicting 
claims on how to draw territorial boundaries? To answer these questions we need to 
consider how the permissive theory of territorial rights responds to the third problem 
raised at the beginning of this article: the particularity question. 
 
VI.  
 
It may be worth tackling this question by comparing the permissive theory of territorial 
rights with a class of rival, but sufficiently similar, views: legitimacy-based accounts. As 
in the permissive theory, territorial rights are justified with reference to how the will of 
citizens is involved in a decision-making authority with coercive powers such as the 
state. In this group of theories the ability to guarantee the rule of law; to protect basic 
human rights; and to provide sufficient opportunities guaranteeing citizens’ democratic 
participation are all essential criteria to understand why the state is justified to 
establish and maintain jurisdiction over a piece of land. Moreover, legitimacy-based 
accounts are sensitive not just to what opportunities citizens make available to each 
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other through the institutions of the state but also on how these institutions relate to 
outsiders. Hence, to the list of `internal` criteria, legitimacy-based accounts usually add 
a set of supplementary, ´external` requirements. To mention but the most relevant ones, 
a state is entitled to exercise territorial rights if it is not implicated in human rights 
violations outside its borders; if its citizens have a rightful claim to be in the specific 
territory defined by the boundaries of the state, and if the state has not come to 
establish territorial rights through usurpation of others’ land (Buchanan 2004; Stilz 
2011).  
 But let us consider more carefully this last requirement. Its rationale is of course 
clear: if we only focus on the conditions that a state must presently satisfy in order to be 
able to claim territorial rights, we overlook the potential injustice involved in the 
establishment of its jurisdictional authority over a land that may have been acquired 
through foreign invasion. This question appears in turn linked to the particularity issue 
mentioned above. To understand the kind of wrongdoing involved in acts of occupation 
of foreign lands on the part of other, perhaps internally just, states we must be able to 
explain why not just any given territory but a particular piece of land falls under the 
jurisdiction of any given state. 
Yet, resolving this question reveals a tension at the heart of the legitimacy-based 
justification of territorial rights. Least the reasoning be circular, usurpation does not 
count as usurpation unless an independent reason has been given as to why people are 
collectively entitled to be in a particular territory and not in another. But this is also 
where the problem lies. If we are trying to explain what justifies territorial rights, we 
cannot introduce criteria (such as the non-usurpation one) that rely on territorial rights 
having already been justified. All that the latter argument goes to show is how 
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boundaries could be rightfully protected and preserved once they have been 
established, not how they ought to be drawn in the first instance.  
How does the permissive theory of territorial rights help us address the 
particular boundary problem? Recall our observations on what provisionally justifies 
individual settlement, and recall the permissive principle through which we framed 
initial acquisition. Earlier in the article we argued that agents were provisionally 
permitted to take control over any given piece of land, if they had been brought there by 
nature or chance, if they willed the use of the land, and if they entered in a political 
union ruling in the name of all. To say that these agents were prima facie permitted to 
acquire a piece of land is not to say that they could lay conclusive claim to it. It is simply 
to emphasize that if this is coupled with a commitment to join a universal rightful 
political authority, we can reflect on their action by exceptionally suspending the 
prohibition of not interfering with others’ ends. Individuals need somewhere to be, and 
they also need some way of securing their existence on earth. Taking control of land and 
establishing a particular jurisdiction in could have been one plausible, if unilateral, way 
of achieving this goal. But, as we saw above, unilaterality is permitted only in virtue of 
what it purports to achieve: a condition where jointly framed political institutions 
rightfully regulate the claims of all. 
What this argument suggests is that states are the kinds of institution where a 
first approximation to the idea of a universal union of people mutually constraining 
each other’s freedom has been reached (to some degree). The fact that the union of 
individuals in states provides a first approximation to the establishment of universal 
rightful conditions is extremely important. For, as we shall shortly see, this introduces 
one relevant disanalogy regarding how we go about, politically, trying to shift from a 
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condition in which rights over specific portions of territory are assigned in a permissive 
way to one in which they are conclusively established. But before examining the 
implications of this point, let us return to the particularity question. Why do states enjoy 
a permission to exercise territorial rights in one specific area of geographical space 
rather than another?   
To answer this question we can draw on our analysis of settlement as occupying 
a permanent place in the world. Groups of people are naturally separated from others: 
one reason may be geographical features, for example the fact that there is an ocean 
here, a river there, mountains between fields, and so on. Initially only geographical 
features might explain what forces certain individuals and not others to act in common 
within a given area. Of course as their relationships improve other commonalities might 
develop: they might start speaking the same language, they might share a set of 
practices through which they regulate life together, and so on. Nationalists may be right 
that this is how groups end up occupying specific areas of geographical space. 
Acquisition theories may be right to say that it matters if these groups collectively 
improve the territory and deserve to enjoy the benefits of their work. But neither 
argument is enough to explain how a particular portion of territory could be considered 
permanently theirs and how outsiders can be forced to stay away. Other theories, for 
example legitimacy-based ones, might add that only when groups of people are united 
in a political association similar to the one we call `state` the conditions for lasting 
possession are established. But again, that is no more than a first step. Entering in state-
based political relations only partially absolves members from the unilateral acquisition 
of commonly available areas of the Earth. For even if we grant that, upon entering the 
civil condition, external possessions within a particular political association are 
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allocated with due consideration for the equal claims of fellow-members, the 
unilaterality of their acts with regard to all other agents remains unresolved.  
The case of individuals constituted in states displays a similar unilaterality with 
regard to external acquisition as that of individuals within the state. By taking 
possession of a specific territory and enacting a public system of laws in it, citizens both 
exercise their external right to appropriate previously available land and prevent it 
from being available to anyone else. On the one hand, their acquisition of particular 
territories is linked to their necessary occupation and collective subjection to a system 
of laws; on the other hand it is incompatible with the freedom of whoever else is outside 
and finds itself under a unilaterally imposed obligation of abstention. The need for a 
system of rights assigning to each agent what belongs to it, subject to reciprocally 
binding constraints is felt in the case of citizens of different states as much as in the 
individual one. Before that, any existing partition of the territory is only provisional and 
conditional at best. 
One might object to this argument by saying that there is a relevant disanalogy 
between states’ exercise of territorial rights and that of individual property rights in the 
state of nature. But the permissive theory need not deny that. Its claims are not 
grounded on an argument `by analogy`, they are grounded on an argument of 
interdependence. The principle that permits unilateral acquisition lifts the prohibition 
of not-interfering with each other’s freedom only by imposing an obligation to join a 
universal public political authority. Without this, any system of exclusive control of 
external things (whether individual or collective) cannot be considered conclusive. 
Of course, had the usable space on earth been infinitely large, states could 
exercise territorial jurisdiction wherever they wished without their citizens’ affecting 
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each other’s claims. But the spatially determined and finite nature of areas available on 
earth makes the problem of unilateral acquisition of usable areas of the earth and the 
related infringement of other’s freedom one of the most pernicious. Permissive 
principles allow us to consider acts of initial acquisition provisionally justified but 
conditional upon the creation of a rightful political authority. This obligation is not 
exhausted when individual claims are subjected to a domestic general will. Permissive 
principles do not apply merely to individual holdings; they also apply to territorial 
jurisdictions.  
In the absence of political conditions under which external acquisition is made 
consistent with the equal freedom of every potential inhabitant of the Earth, the 
holdings of individuals, and the territorial rights of states through which those holdings 
are protected, will remain merely provisional. Settlement and exclusion are permitted 
only if they are followed by a duty to enter in rightful political relations overcoming the 
unilaterality of first occupation. The entrance into state-based political relations is only 
a partial, even if very important, step towards the justification of lasting possession. 
Without the further integration of that internal act of political constitution-formation 
with a project to enter into universally inclusive political relations, the rights to both 
property and territory exercised by citizens of particular states can hardly be 
permanently justified.  
Let us now consider more closely how the permissive theory of territorial rights 
addresses the particularity question compared to other accounts. One interesting 
feature is that we can afford to be ecumenical with regard to how groups of people end 
up occupying specific geographical areas. Different theories of territorial rights will 
have different views on why exactly this particular group of people, in this particular 
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territory has succeeded in taking control and establishing certain political institutions. 
Acquisition theories will argue that individuals or collective property owners have 
made efficient use of its land and resources. Nationalist theories will argue that a group 
sharing particular historical and cultural features has developed a material and 
symbolic relationship to the land, involving both present and future generations. 
Legitimacy-based theories will argue that this coincides with the area where the state 
has successfully managed to enforce the rule of law. And so on. From the point of view 
of the permissive theory of territorial rights, even if the citizens of particular states have 
ended up occupying particular territories in either one of the ways described by these 
accounts, the kind of claims they can be collectively authorized to make over specific 
areas of geographical space are provisional and conditional at best. 
Thus, even if first occupation matters to establish provisional rights, the 
particularity problem cannot be solved with an inward-looking approach which 
neglects how citizens of that state interact with others, both across space and across 
time. The answer to the question of why states are entitled to one particular area of 
geographical space cannot be conclusively provided; not until a political authority 
realizing the universal principle of right is founded. Permissive principles may well end 
up endorsing the kind of boundaries that we have. The conclusive justification of these 
boundaries is not necessarily constrained by what was done in the past for these 
boundaries to emerge in the current form. What matters especially is how states now 
act politically to overcome the unilaterality of that initial acquisition, not how territory 
was initially subjected to their control. 
  
VII. 
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The implications of this view may appear slightly troubling. Does the permissive theory 
of territorial rights imply that any well-meaning state can now currently invade the 
territory of another (recalcitrant) state provided it forces it to enter into a universal 
political association? Does it imply that the current territorial claims of long-suffering 
nations or the demands of internally oppressed ethnic groups are better ignored? Does 
it imply that we should pay no attention to the present distribution of natural resources 
because any state can continue to enjoy what it has? 
Kant explicitly condemns any act of territorial annexation. But he does so in ways 
that might appear to undermine the application of permissive principles to territorial 
rights. So let me start answering these questions by putting at rest the objection that 
denies a possible application of the permissive principle to issues of territorial rights. In 
his famous passage condemning usurpation, Kant argues that a state is ´like a trunk, it 
has its own roots and to annex it to another state is to do away with its existence as a 
moral person` (8: 344:318). One might infer from this position that the territory of 
states is analogous to the body of an individual, where the presumption of inviolability 
would be grounded on the fact that states are equivalent to moral persons who do not 
come to acquire territory but who simply ´have it`.15 Since no external objects of choice 
would be at stake, no unilaterality problem would arise. But Kant clearly indicates that 
permissive principles do apply to territorial issues, indeed he introduces the very 
definition of such principles in the context of illustrating the wrongness of acquiring 
territory by means of inheritance, exchange, sale or donation (8: 347-8; 320-1). His 
argument is that even though the ´status of possession` (Besitzstand) of a certain 
territory acquired by those means is incompatible with the principles of right, his 
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prohibition of such annexations only applies to the `way of acquiring` in the future and 
does not require us to remedy what was done in the past. This, he argues, is because 
even though the ´status of possession` of a given territory ´does not have what is 
required in order to be called right` this was ´in its time … taken to be legitimate 
according to the public opinion of each state at the time` (8: 347-8; 320-1).  
This appeal to the ´public opinion` of the time is crucial to understand how we 
are to deal with territorial claims that have emerged as a result of violations of others’ 
claims, including cases in which the criterion of first occupation is too abstract to 
understand current settlement. Descendents of settlers whose history in the territory 
reflect past wrongdoings cannot avoid occupying the space that they currently occupy. 
From a Kantian perspective they have claims to territory because they have ended up 
where they are ´by nature or chance`, as a result of historical contingencies upon which 
they have no control.16 This does not imply that their presence in the territory is 
compatible with principles of right, even when those violations were not perceived as 
such at the time in which they occurred. The establishment of collective territorial 
claims is unilateral, just like the possession of land by the citizens’ of particular states is 
unilateral.  
The partition of boundaries is therefore not beyond critique. Permissive 
principles should be understood as transition principles; they can be retroactively 
invoked to justify a unilateral past acquisition in the absence of rightful conditions of 
reciprocal interaction.17 But even that past acquisition is only justified conditionally, 
subject to the obligation of entering into universal conditions of right.18 Once the 
mechanisms for a rightful distribution of territorial claims are in place, the wrong of 
unilateral settlement ceases to be absolved in light of its compatibility with the public 
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opinion of the time. It requires states to submit to the rules of a collective authority 
adjudicating the distribution of territorial claims according to principles of right.   
But what are we to make of cases where states refuse to acknowledge the 
obligation to enter into rightful political relations with all other states? Kant condemns 
annexation both when it is aimed at superseding historical wrongs and at forcing 
universal collective rule. No unilateral action is justified in the civil condition, neither 
that which attempts to restore justice where it is considered absent, nor that which 
attempts to force recalcitrant states to join a rightful political association. Once some 
basis for the establishment of rightful conditions has been constructed, we are not in the 
state of nature; our institutions, though imperfect, have prepared the conditions under 
which principles of right can be fully realized. Some constraints on unilateral individual 
actions have already been placed, at least as far as those sharing the same jurisdiction 
are concerned.19 Hence, even though the citizens of any given state are only 
provisionally entitled to the territory they currently occupy, this does not mean that 
other states can claim it by means of another unilateral act. The obligation to overcome 
the wrong of unilateral settlement falls on the citizens of states where internal 
mechanisms of democratic decision-making are in place. But someone might object: 
what if we are dealing not with states but with groups of people which have failed to 
establish even these minimal institutional foundations?  
This is a very serious question. Kant raises it when assessing the attempts of 
colonists to settle in particular areas contrary to the will of natives, and by appealing to 
the backward nature of their social organization. It might be asked, he argues, whether 
´when neither nature nor chance but just our own will brings us into the neighborhood 
of a people that holds no prospect of a civil union with it, we should not be authorized to 
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found colonies, by force if need be, in order to establish a civil union with them and 
bring these human beings (savages) into a rightful condition`. The attempt of European 
powers to settle in territories inhabited by the American Indians, the Hottentots or the 
inhabitants of New Holland, and to justify these colonial enterprises through 
acquisition-theories of territorial rights was all too familiar in his days.20 Kant’s answer 
is that ´all these supposedly good intentions cannot wash away the stain of injustice in 
the means used for them` (6: 353; 490). But the argument is not targeted merely at the 
prohibition of violence, as such. It holds even when more subtle measures are endorsed, 
for example when we ask whether we should not be authorized to control the territory 
of these natives ´by fraudulent purchase of their land` and ´by making use of our 
superiority without regard for their first possessions` (6: 266; 417). 
These remarks are not without contemporary resonance: how distant is the 
situation Kant describes from one in which the soil and resources of these less-civilized 
(now we would say ´developing`) countries is purchased by a dozen companies based in 
so-called democratic states? What difference does it make if crowds of colonists 
reaching exotic shores have been replaced by teams of lawyers and bankers flying in 
business class? And most importantly, how does the permissive theory of territorial 
rights both compel countries to enter into political relations with each other and justify 
their resistance when forced to doing so? 
To answer this question we need to consider what exactly the permissive 
principle prescribes with regard to relations between groups whose territorial rights 
have only provisionally been established. Since the earth is initially commonly available 
for use, and since territorial rights are only provisionally justified, outsiders cannot be 
denied a right to visit. To claim otherwise would be to arm occupiers with a permanent 
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right to exclude – something that, as we have seen, is impossible to unilaterally 
establish. ´Since possession of the land, on which an inhabitant of the earth can live, can 
be thought of as possession of a part of a determinate whole, and so as possession to 
which each of them originally has a right, it follows that all nations stand originally in a 
community of land` (6: 352; 498). This however is not a rightful community of 
possession (communio) and consequently of use of the land. For that, as we have seen, 
we need a universally inclusive mechanism of political adjudication.  
Now, the fact that occupation does not equip natives with a claim as strong as the 
right to exclude well-meaning visitors, does not imply that these visitors are granted a 
right to settle. Unilaterality presents a threat in both directions: when displayed by 
natives we mitigate its consequences by granting foreigners a right to visit; when 
displayed by foreigners we mitigate its consequences by refusing them a right to settle. 
In both cases, Kant says, a special contract is required to regulate their reciprocal 
relations; one which is arrived at without exploiting the ignorance of the parties and 
which cannot, in any case, be permanently established unless ´it extends to the entire 
human race` (6: 266; 418). 
There is a final important point to mention when examining the application of 
permissive principles to the issue of territorial rights. Even though, as we have seen, the 
realms of domestic, international and cosmopolitan right are interdependent and 
neither of them can be safeguarded without working for the realization of the other, one 
relevant issue deserves attention. In the case of individuals, permissive principles 
recognize the legitimacy of initial acquisition only at the price of coercing them to join a 
rightful political condition. In the case of states, as Kant’s reaction to colonialism (and, 
by extension, neo-colonialism) has illustrated, dissenting states can be invited but not 
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coerced to enter in rightful political relations with other states. But how can the 
permissive theory of territorial rights both compel states to join a rightful political 
association yet also acknowledge the legitimacy of their resistance in doing so? How can 
subjection to a reciprocally established political authority be both necessary and 
avoidable? 
    To say that outsiders cannot exercise force on dissenting states to induce them to 
enter in rightful political relations with them, is not the same as saying that no attempt 
should be made to that effect. Kant’s reasons for rejecting the interventionist attitude 
have to do with the fact that, however primitive, an association of individuals with some 
form of social organization and with a will to subject to joint rule, is already a step 
beyond an anarchic society where individuals act with no common aim (Ypi 2008; 
Flikschuh 2010). This is also the crucial difference between individual appropriators in 
the state of nature, and collective political agents attempting to enter in rightful political 
relations with each other. The reasons for resisting the temptation to invade outsiders 
to promote their political emancipation are similar to the ones for not endorsing an 
internal right of rebellion: there is always a transition point where all public authority is 
destroyed and the conditions upon which principles of right rest are annihilated.21  
It should be noted however that the right to exclude is here provisional and 
conditional just like the territorial claims made by those groups are provisional and 
conditional. The fact that foreigners have only a right to visit and not to settle does not 
imply that natives have no obligation to join a universal political association responsible 
for adjudicating territorial claims. The necessity of this political association is not in 
question; the issue rather concerns the modalities according to which it ought to come 
about. Kant does not retreat from a strong demand for the construction of a similar 
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authority to a weaker position explaining how peoples’ whose territorial claims are only 
provisionally justified can legitimately exclude outsiders. The right to visit applies only 
provisionally and conditionally too. But the point of emphasizing the provisional and 
conditional status of territorial rights is not to say that boundaries should be arbitrarily 
dissolved or arbitrarily redrawn, or to justify the right of so-called legitimate states to 
intervene in the territory of others. To maintain that, would be to engage in the same 
kind of unilateral judgment that makes permissive principles applicable in the first 
place.  
It is legitimate to ask what kind of claims might be adjudicated by a global 
political association similar to the one Kant advocates and what specific institutional 
form the enforcement its demands might take.  Kant’s texts appear very ambiguous on 
the first issue, limited as they are to emphasizing why a similar authority is necessary 
from the point of view of right but not how it would positively work. However, we can 
identify several areas in which such an authority might intervene to resolve conflicting 
claims related to the territorial dimension of political rule. One aspect might be 
controversies concerning the drawing of boundaries and the rights of specific peoples to 
occupy a particular piece of land, including disputes arising from secession (Brilmayer 
1991, Buchanan 1991). Another aspect might be control of the movement of people, the 
distribution of the burdens of migration and potential grounds for excluding outsiders 
once claims to territory have been conclusively established (Risse 2009). A third issue 
might be the distribution of natural resources related to the use of territory by citizens 
of particular states (Beitz 1999; Pogge 1994; Wenar 2008). Finally an important area of 
intervention might be the resolution of conflicts arising from claims to territory made 
by future generations, following the foreseeable effects of, say, environmental change 
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(Nine 2010). If citizens of particular states were to make decisions on all these issues 
without seeking to render their claims consistent with those of others, the imposition of 
their will upon those affected by such decisions would be very difficult to justify. Only a 
universal political association providing a forum for inclusive decision-making to all 
citizens of the earth can avoid the constraints on freedom that a similar unilateral way 
of proceeding inevitably generates.  
The global character of a similar association (i.e. the need for it to give a say to all 
the inhabitants of the earth) is also not in question. Yet Kant is somewhat ambiguous on 
whether we should conceive of such authority as one with coercive power over its 
members as a free league of states (Ypi 2008).22 The latter seems more compatible with 
his observation that existing states, notwithstanding the provisional nature of their 
territorial claims, present us with a form of association different from relations between 
individuals in the state of nature. Yet the permissive theory of territorial rights does not 
provide an effortless answer to how a similar global political authority is constructed in 
the first place and the concrete institutional shape it takes. But what it does give us is a 
standard on the basis of which to frame our political judgments; a political end to the 
realization of which to direct our civic enterprise. The idea of a universal association of 
states plays in the permissive theory of territorial rights a regulative function, it 
supports members of that political association in developing emancipatory political 
projects and it directs their efforts to a universally encompassing ideal of rightful 
relations. The duty to reform institutions so as to make more progress in the direction 
of a rightful political association of states should be interpreted as a civic and historical 
duty: its content is not dictated by a philosopher’s invective but ought to be collectively 
framed. 
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VIII. 
 
Let me conclude this discussion by considering how the permissive theory of territorial 
rights addresses the three questions I raised at the beginning of this article: the right to 
settle, to exclude and to settle and exclude with regard to a specific territory. The right 
to settle is explained through agents’ occupation of some area of geographical space and 
their joint creation of a collective political authority that adjudicates claims compatibly 
with principles of equal freedom, within a given territory. To the extent to which this 
use of the territory necessarily affects outsiders and entails a unilateral infringement of 
their freedom, the right to exclude is permitted only if coupled with the attempt to 
establish rightful political relations between states. Consequently outsiders cannot be 
denied a right to enter, but neither can they be granted a permanent right to settle. This 
condition also helps to explain why even though acquisition of a particular territory is a 
result of historical and political contingencies that can only be retroactively justified, 
this contingency does not authorize us to modify the present partition of boundaries. It 
simply compels us to invest political efforts in creating a kind of political association in 
which territorial claims can be subject to global, public arbitration. 
The permissive theory of territorial rights acknowledges the contingency of 
boundaries and ascribes territorial rights to states only provisionally and conditionally. 
However we ought to be cautious about jumping into conclusions about how these 
conditions ought to be enforced. If we take seriously the permissive principle laid out 
above, states’ present enjoyment of rights over their territory is intrinsically bound to 
their taking up a series of political obligations towards both their citizens and outsiders. 
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A state’s domestic jurisdiction cannot be assessed regardless of how it acts in the 
international sphere; it is intrinsically related to it. The permissive theory of territorial 
rights makes us, as citizens, aware of both the historical contingency of territory and of 
its political necessity. Whilst rendering permissible the maintenance of an order which 
appears, as such, intrinsically hard to justify, it compels us to invest political efforts in 
rising above its unilaterality.23 
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Notes 
 
                                                          
1 One exception is Stilz 2009 whose use of Kant is more in line with legitimacy-based 
accounts than with the permissive theory developed in this article; see also Stilz 2011. 
2 There is a discussion in the Kantian literature on whether the best translation for 
Erlaubnisgesetz is permissive ´principle´ or ´law´. Kant’s use of the Latin lex, indicates 
that the term ´law´ might be appropriate. Here I shall ignore that controversy and follow 
Mary Gregor in using both ´principle´ and ´law´ as they appear in the relevant 
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translations. References in the text are to the volume and page numbers of the German 
Academy edition, followed by page numbers of the Cambridge edition of the works of 
Kant, especially Kant 1996. 
3 A pioneering analysis of Kant’s Erlaubnisgesetz showing its relevance for the entire 
Doctrine of Right can be found in Brandt 1982. For an account of Kant’s development of 
the concept, also in the context of other historical analyses of permissive principles, see 
Tierney 2001a and Tierney 2001b. For a rigorous discussion of the systematic role of 
permissive principles in Kant’s Doctrine of Right see Flikschuh 2000. In this article I 
follow authors such as Brandt and Flikschuh who take Kant’s definitions of permissive 
laws that appear in the Doctrine of Right and in Perpetual Peace to be consistent. For an 
argument that they are not see Hruschka 2004. 
4 I have discussed this issue in Ypi 2008. 
5 The issue is, however, contested. Some argue that if the term really derived from 
´terra`, the Latin derivation should read ´terratorium`, not ´territorum`. An alternative 
explanation claims that the word might in fact derive from ´terrere`, that is to frighten, 
to terrorize, which in turn implies that ´territory` is ´a place from which people are 
frightened off, or warned`. Interestingly enough, here the etymology of territory would 
come closer to the etymology of ´terrorism`.  For more on this issue see Delaney 2005: 
14 and Baldwin 1992: 209-10. 
 
7 For some authors the relationship of the geographical territory to the state is 
somewhat similar to the relationship of a property-owner with the territory that is in 
his property (e.g. Simmons 2001; Steiner 1996). Others insist that while property rights 
relate to the ability of agents to control (use, exchange, transfer etc.) the resources in 
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their power, states’ territorial rights include also rights to jurisdiction (i.e. rights to 
create and enforce legal rules within that specific territory) and meta-jurisdictional 
authority (i.e. capacity to modify the boundaries of jurisdictions). For discussions see 
Brilmayer 1989; Buchanan 2003: 232-61; Nine 2008 and Stilz 2009. It is worth noticing 
how all these authors agree that, to some extent, the claims of public authorities to 
jurisdiction over the territory share some problems with the claims of individual 
property-owners, in particular as regards exclusive use of resources and control of 
outsiders. Although Kant also refers to the sovereign as a ´supreme proprietor (dominus 
territorii)` (6: 324; 466), he clarifies that the sovereign has no land of its own and that 
the idea of supreme proprietorship is equivalent to that of a civil union that assigns to 
each what is his, consistently with principles of right. It is therefore possible to illustrate 
some of the problems with existing theories of territorial rights without placing too 
much emphasis on the analogy between the state and an individual property owner and 
simply focusing on the conditions under which a collective political body can exercise 
territorial jurisdiction compatibly with principles of equal freedom.    
8 For a similar characterization see also Simmons 2001 and Miller forthcoming. 
9 For an argument that links territorial rights to common ownership see Risse 2009. 
10 For developments of the individualist version see Steiner 1996 and Simmons 2001, 
for collectivist interpretations see Meisels 2005 and Nine 2008. 
11See 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50221032?query_type=word&queryword=settle
ment&first=1&max_to_show=10&single=1&sort_type=alpha  
12 I say more on this point in section VI below. 
13 For a critique of the argument by “analogy” see also Flikschuh 2010. 
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14 Of course, in the case of future generations participation in democratic political 
decision-making might compensate for the arbitrariness of previous decisions applying 
to them; the same however could not be said with regard to outsiders.  
15 This is exactly how Arthur Ripstein puts it, by arguing that in the case of states there 
is neither a problem of unilateral choice in the establishment of the “mine and thine” 
nor one of mutual assurance in the use of force, but only one of indeterminacy in the 
interpretation of the right to self-defence (Ripstein 2009: 227-8). 
16 Or, as Kant would have put it, they have been brought there “by nature or chance”. 
For a discussion of the implications of this point see Waldron 2002. 
17 This argument is very clear: ´in the permissive law here, the prohibition presupposed 
is directed only to the future way of acquiring a rights (e.g. by inheritance) whereas the 
exemption from this prohibition, i.e. the permission is directed to the present status of 
possession, which in the transition from the state of nature to the civil condition can 
continue as possession that, though not in conformity with rights, is still possession in 
good faith`.   
18 As Kant puts it, ´this authorization to continue in possession, would not occur if such 
an alleged acquisition were to take place in the civil condition; for then as soon as its 
nonconformity with rights were discovered it would have to cease, as a wrong` (8: 348; 
321). 
19 And of course some institutions might be better than others from the point of view of 
fully realizing the principles of right. As already emphasized, the purpose of this article 
is primarily to illustrate the logic of permissive principles, not to go into detailed 
discussions on different institutional arrangements. 
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20 For a study of the relationship between the Lockean theory of acquisition and 
colonialism see Arneil 1996.  For a discussion of Kant’s cosmopolitanism in relationship 
to colonialism see Niesen 2007. 
21 Consider, for example, Kant’s remarks on the analogy between foreign invasion and 
revolution: ´the attempt to realize this idea should not be made by revolution, by a leap, 
that is, by violent overthrow of an already existing defective constitution (for there 
would be an intervening moment in which any rightful condition would be annihilated)` 
(6: 355; 492). 
 
23 Earlier versions of this article were presented at the University of Warwick, Political 
Theory Seminar, at the University of Frankfurt, Cluster of Excellence on “The Formation 
of Normative Orders”, at the American Political Science Association Meeting, at the 
Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin, at the “Karl Popper” research seminar of the LSE Philosophy 
department and at the Centre for the Study of Social Justice, University of Oxford. I am 
grateful to participants at these events as well as to Arash Abizadeh, Oliviero Angeli, 
Chris Armstrong, Bob Goodin, Peter Niesen, Avia Pasternak, Adina Preda, Andrew 
Rehfeld, Annie Stilz, Ines Valdez, Laura Valentini, Jonathan White and two anonymous 
reviewers of this journal for their particularly helpful written comments. 
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